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Resumen: El objetivo del presente artículo es hacer patente la necesidad 
de una cosmología en el pensamiento de Peirce. Para alcanzar dicho ob-
jetivo me propongo clarificar en primer lugar la definición de cosmología 
de Peirce y su lugar en la clasificación de las ciencias. Luego me propongo 
arrojar luz sobre la implicación de la cosmología en la concepción de la 
metafísica y de la lógica de Peirce, y elucidar estas conexiones a la vista de 
su “Synechism”. Finalmente, a partir de los resultados obtenidos, intento 
aportar una descripción sumaria de la cosmología de Peirce, distinta de su 
interpretación habitual.
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Abstract: The aim of the present paper is to show the need for cosmol-
ogy in Peirce’s thought. To reach this goal, I first clarify Peirce’s definition 
of cosmology and its place in the classification of the sciences. Then, I 
shed slight on the entailment of cosmology in Peirce’s understanding of 
metaphysics and of logic, and I elucidate these connections in view of 
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Synechism. Finally, in the light of the results achieved through the analy-
sis, I provide a summarily description of Peirce’s cosmology, far from the 
common interpretation of it. 
Keywords: cosmology, cosmogony, universe, metaphysics, logic, syn-
echism, categories.
§1. IntroductIon
From the 50ies onwards, many have tackled Peirce’s cosmology (Cfr. especial-
ly Gallie (1952), Turley (1977), Esposito (1980), Hausman (1993), Reynolds 
(2002))1, every time wrestling with this so-called “black sheep” or “white ele-
phant” (Gallie, 1952: 216) of Peirce’s thought. There are at least three reasons 
why this epithet of “black sheep” has been attributed to Peirce’s cosmology: first 
of all it is due to the constitutive complexity of Peirce’s cosmological thought –
the latter being usually identified with Peirce’s writings from 1883/84 to 1898–, 
second for the lack of consistency with the rest of Peirce’s writings, and third be-
cause such a deep metaphysical and speculative thought does not easily go with 
“the positivistic temper of philosophy throughout the first half of the twenti-
eth century” (Reynolds, 2002: 1). Indeed, in accordance with this philosophical 
tendency, in the past century Peirce’s cosmology has been often set aside by his 
scholarship, in favor of logic and semiotics. For these reasons, Hookway wrote 
in 1985 that “Peirce’s cosmology has not received any fully adequate treatment 
in the secondary literature” (Hookway, 1985: 291, fn), in like manner Andrew 
Reynolds expressed the same opinion in 2002 (Reynolds, 2002: 1), and we can 
reaffirm it also today.2 
Moreover, in line with Gallie and the “anti-cosmological/speculative” trend, 
recently has been even pointed out that Peirce did not have any proper cosmolo-
1 But also Goudge (1950), Murphey (1961), Sini (1981), Hookway (1985), Fabbrichesi (1986), 
Apel (1987), Corrington (1993), Sheriff (1994), Rosenthal (1994), Anderson (1995), Parker (1998), 
Ventimiglia (2008), Short (2010a), Short (2010b), Dilworth (2011), Guardiano (2011).
2 Although Reynolds’s book did provide an analysis of Peirce’s cosmological writings deeper than 
the previous ones, I do not fully agree with his view of cosmology as Peirce’s “scientific metaphysics,” 
because the meaning and the concept itself of “scientific metaphysics” is highly problematic, as it has 
been illustrated by Nubiola (2014). 
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gy. Indeed, in 2010 Thomas Short maintained that Peirce did not have any cos-
mology at all, but only a “program of cosmological inquiry” (Short, 2010: 522)
[italics mine], consisting in explaining “the laws of nature as having evolved 
from chaos” (Short, 2010: 521). A program that, according to Short, was in any 
case intended to fail. I do not want to discuss in detail Short’s arguments; what 
I want to put into question here is the assumption entailed in this radical thesis, 
one that stands also apart from his arguments. The assumption I am referring 
to is what cosmology is. Can we assume that Peirce’s cosmology corresponds to 
an explanation of “the laws of nature as having evolved from chaos?” Although 
this definition of Peirce’s cosmology is often given for granted, it is appropriate 
to make us sure of its adequacy, in order to reach a full and accurate understand-
ing of Peirce’s cosmological thought. In other words, in order to understand 
whether or not Peirce really had a cosmology, to explain it and to evaluate its 
consistency, we should first of all understand what cosmology means according 
to Peirce. 
Accordingly, the first hint toward Peirce’s cosmology will be an appropriate 
definition of cosmology, and to this aim the first part of the paper is devoted. 
More specifically, the definition of cosmology will represent the first hint toward 
cosmology because, as the author says, “without a definition of course all the 
reasoning […] is fallacious” (Cfr. MS 178 D, 1884)3. Furthermore, I do not 
want to reach a general definition of cosmology, one either commonly used to-
day or at Peirce’s time, but I will refer to Peirce’s own definition. In fact, among 
the numerous entries of the Century Dictionary that Peirce wrote between 1883 
and 1909, also ‘cosmology’ was under his responsibility. Only carrying out the 
analysis of Peirce’s definition of cosmology and its place within Peirce’s numer-
ous classifications of the sciences, we will be able to understand what cosmology 
means according to Peirce, and whether his cosmological thought is limited to 
the essays he wrote between 1883/4 and 1898, namely from the lecture “Design 
and Chance” (1884) to the lecture series “Reasoning and the Logic of Things” 
(1898).
3 “MS” stands for “manuscript”. Indeed, Peirce’s manuscripts, with over 100.000 unpublished 
pages, form a vast bibliographic resource. They are numbered according to the catalogue provided by 
Richard Robin.
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§2. cosmology: Its defInItIon and Place wIthIn the classIfIcatIon  
of the scIences 
On pages 1288-89 of the Century Dictionary we can read the definition as 
follows:
Cosmology […] 1. The general science or theory of the cosmos or material uni-
verse, of its parts, elements, and laws; the general discussion and coordination 
of the results of special sciences. […] 2. That branch of metaphysics which is 
concerned with the a priori discussion of the ultimate philosophical problems 
relating to the world as it exists in time and space, and to the order of nature. 
(Whitney, 1889-1891: 1288-89)
From this we see that according to Peirce cosmology is to be understood, on 
the one hand, as the “general science of the cosmos or material universe,” which 
coordinates the results of special sciences; on the other hand, more specifically, 
Peirce defines cosmology as the branch of metaphysics which addresses ultimate 
philosophical problems “relating to the world as it exists in space and time, and 
to the order of nature.”
In addition, a few lines below this definition, Peirce emphasizes a difference 
that is very useful for the present concern. He distinguishes cosmogony from cos-
mology in this way: “Cosmogony treats of the way in which the world or the uni-
verse came to be; cosmology, of its general theory, of its structure and parts, as it is 
found existing” (Whitney, 1889-1891: 1289). In this sense, cosmology consists 
of the general theory and structure of the universe, and cosmogony is only a 
part of this, and not equivalent to cosmology; as is also confirmed by the Greek 
etymology of the words (“cosmology:” κόσμος+λογία, meaning the treatise of 
the world, and “cosmogony:” κόσμος+γόνος, meaning the creation or origin 
of the world). Acknowledging this difference prevents us from confusing cos-
mogony with cosmology, and helps us avoid reducing cosmology to cosmogony. 
Indeed, if apply this differentiation to Peirce’s work, we should notice that he 
employs both terms, and that their distinction makes his general, philosophical 
aims clearer. For instance, in “The Architecture of Theories” the author speaks 
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of his work as a “Cosmogonic Philosophy” (Peirce, 2010: 110)4, and presents 
cosmogony as a feasible path for reaching a cosmology. In other words, he aims 
at achieving an account of the universe’s structure and parts by sketching out the 
universe’s coming to be. Moreover, with regard to this cosmogonic program, he 
adds: “that idea has been worked out by me with elaboration. It accounts for the 
main features of the universe as we know it” (Peirce, 1891, W 8.110) [italics mine].
Accordingly, at least until 1891, Peirce had as his goal to build a cosmology 
(that is, to account for the main features of the universe) by formulating a cos-
mogony (that is, by studying how the universe came to be), as he also confirmed 
in a letter to Christine Ladd-Franklin in August 1891 (Peirce, CP 8.317-18). 
And how about Peirce’s mature thought? Is there any evidence of a cosmological 
thought in the later writings? Before analyzing this aspect of Peirce’s philoso-
phy, it is remarkable to note that it is now clearer, by means of this distinction 
between cosmology and cosmogony, that the achievement of a successful cos-
mology does not merely consist in an explanation of how the world came to be, 
but rather corresponds to an exhaustive answer to the question: “Which are the 
existing universe’s structure and parts?” Besides, the meaning of cosmology can 
be further clarified by touching on its place within the classification of sciences. 
Peirce was one of the most prominent contributors in elaborating a classifica-
tion of the sciences between 19th and 20th centuries. Between 1889 and 1903, 
numerous versions of classifications can be found in his writings, with slightly 
different characteristics. In all of them cosmology belongs to metaphysics: it is a 
branch of metaphysics. More specifically, referring to “An Outline Classification 
of the Sciences” (Peirce, 1998: 258-262, 1903)5, cosmology does not appear as 
one of the principal branch of metaphysics, but can be considered under the 
branch “physical metaphysics.” In classifying metaphysics, the author says:
Metaphysics may be divided into, i, General Metaphysics, or Ontology; ii, Psy-
chical, or Religious, Metaphysics, concerned chiefly with the questions of 1, God, 
4 I refer to the eight volume of the Writings of Charles S. Peirce: A Chronological Edition, from now 
referred to as W, followed by page number.
5 This is the second volume of The Essential Peirce: Selected Philosophical Writings. From now on 
referred to as EP 1 or 2, followed by page number.
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2, Freedom, 3, Immortality; and iii, Physical Metaphysics, which discusses the 
real nature of time, space, laws of nature, matter, etc. (Peirce, EP 2.260)6
From this presentation, cosmology should pertain to “physical metaphys-
ics,” the latter being defined as that branch of metaphysics “which discusses the 
real nature of time, space, laws of nature, etc.” Effectively, the following year, in 
“Reason’s Conscience,” Peirce distinguishes three special branches within Physical 
Metaphysics, and they are indicated as 1) Cosmology, 2) The Doctrine of Time 
and Space, 3) The Doctrine of Matter (Peirce, 1976: 189). So, cosmology is de-
scribed as a branch of physical metaphysics, or –better yet– of “mathematical 
metaphysics,” as he specifies in 1898, because it is grounded in “minute diagram-
matic reasoning” (Peirce, 1992: 267).7 But what is its specific subject, being it 
distinct from the doctrine of time and space, and from the doctrine of matter? 
If we consider the entry of the dictionary along with this latter classification, we 
will say that cosmology aims to discover and account for the general structure and 
laws of the universe, and expresses them with the degree of generality required by 
all metaphysics. Accordingly, cosmology is still a branch of metaphysics, on which 
also the doctrine of time, space and matter depend, and not of general physics. 
Thus, the first hints toward Peirce’s cosmology are already present in his defi-
nition of cosmology and the place it occupies in the classifications of the sci-
ences. On the one hand, according to Peirce, cosmology concerns “the general 
theory of the universe, its structure and parts, as it is found existing,” as it is 
manifest considering its difference from cosmogony. As a consequence, this also 
means that we are at least legitimated to seek other traces of Peirce’s cosmologi-
cal thought beyond his cosmogonic period, that is later than 1898. On the other 
hand, the fact cosmology appears in Peirce’s classifications of the sciences testifies 
not only to the relevance it had for Peirce, but especially the speculative nature 
of cosmology in his view. In fact, cosmology is not a part of general physics, but 
pertains to metaphysics, to the branch of “physical metaphysics,” that has the 
same generality of a metaphysical investigation, and has the universe its proper 
subject of investigation.
6 Common abbreviation for Peirce (1931-35, 1958).
7 From now on referred to as RLT, which stands for Reasoning and the Logic of Things: The Cam-
bridge Conferences Lectures of 1898.
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Nonetheless, to what extent is cosmology relevant in Peirce’s thought, besides 
the formal place it occupies in the classifications of the sciences? Given that cos-
mology is under the label of metaphysics, in the next part I will examine closer 
the relation between metaphysics and cosmology, according to Peirce.
§3. PeIrce’s PragmatIcIstIc metaPhysIcs: the ImPortance of cosmology
Peirce does not only provide a definition and a classification of cosmology in 
his writings. According to him cosmology plays a pivotal role in his conception 
of pragmaticism. This is partly due to the fact that cosmology is probably the 
branch to which he was committed the most. In 1898 the author asserted that he 
came to the study of philosophy “not for its teaching about God, Freedom, and 
Immortality, but intensely curious about Cosmology and Psychology” (Peirce, 
1898, CP 4.2). Moreover, Peirce himself admitted that was the weakest in psy-
chology, and more at home in Cosmology (Peirce, 1898, RLT 268). 
Anyway, over and above these elements, for him cosmology represents the line 
of demarcation between a ‘bad’ metaphysics and a ‘good’ one. Peirce asserts this 
in “What Pragmatism Is,” an essay written in 1905: “instead of merely jeering at 
metaphysics, like other prope-positivists, whether by long drawn-out parodies or 
otherwise, the pragmaticist extracts from it a precious essence, which will serve 
to give life and light to cosmology and physics” (Peirce, EP 2.339). And this em-
phasis upon cosmology is to be read not only as the difference between a good 
metaphysics and a bad one, but also as one of the main characteristic features of 
Peirce’s philosophy, compared with the other pragmatists. Indeed, it is remark-
able that also Alfred North Whitehead, one of the very few who dared to build 
a cosmology in the 20th century, whose philosophy have impressive similarities 
with Peirce’s one,8 makes the same point by distinguishing his philosophy from 
8 To get an idea of the similarity between Peirce’s and Whitehead’s thoughts, it is sufficient to con-
sider some quotations by people who work with them or was coeaval to them. The first quote I report 
is about a brief episode recalled by Charles Hartshorne, who was collecting Peirce’s papers while was 
Whitehead’s assistant at Harvard. He states: “Whitehead came up once at my request and I showed 
him an essay which had some rather abstruse things to say about geometry. I knew that Whitehead 
was a geometrician. Whitehead read it and said that it was interesting, but that some of it was too 
technical and, he thought, ought to be cut. So we did omit some passages. Whitehead read several 
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James and Schiller’s thoughts, that is from pragmatism as he knew it. As Charles 
Morris recalls: “I would like to record two points Whitehead made in a conver-
sation with me in October 1933. The first was that he thought his philosophy 
embodied all the main insights of pragmatism. The second was his belief that 
the pragmatic movement could be greatly strengthened if it explicitly developed 
a cosmology. His opinion was that his own cosmology seemed to be the sort of 
thing that was needed” (Morris, 1970: 138-9, fn 25). Thus, though Whitehead 
ignored it, Peirce already did what he wanted to do.
In this way, cosmology has to be considered as a distinctive feature of Peirce’s 
pragmaticist metaphysics. However, at times, the difference between metaphysics 
and cosmology can vanish away. On the one hand, the higher degree of general-
ity that belongs to cosmology, and its distinction from a doctrine of time, space, 
and matter, makes it fade into metaphysics (conceived as general ontology); on 
the other, Peirce often defines and describes metaphysics (and sometimes philos-
ophy itself ) in a way very similar to his descriptions of cosmology. For instance, 
he asserts that philosophy “seeks to explain the universe at large” (Peirce, 1890, 
W 8.19), or that metaphysics “has to account for the whole universe of being” 
(Peirce, 1898, CP 6.214). 
In reflecting on to these statements, one could read them as very general defi-
nitions of metaphysics, and then construe cosmology as the branch of metaphys-
pages in which Peirce sounded rather like Whitehead talking for instance about the ‘irrevocable past’ 
and the ‘indeterminate future,’ and Whitehead said to me, ‘I hope you will testify that this is the first 
time I have seen this.’ When I told him that I could find some of his characteristic ideas in Peirce he 
said, ‘Then I say he’s a great man. I’m bound to’” (Lieb, & Hartshorne, 1970: 153). The second one 
is a statement of Henry S. Leonard, written when Whitehead was still alive: “One cannot close [his 
review of Peirce’s Collected Papers] without remarking on the vast number of startling similarities that 
are to be found when one compares the work of Peirce with that of Whitehead. Certain differences 
of style and of method are outstanding. But the number of the common doctrines, both general and 
special, is beyond what might be expected. Both thinkers break into new paths of thought, but it 
largely seems like the common exploration of one new path” (Leonard, 1937: 121). On the whole, 
their philosophies have many tenets in common. Apart from the connections between philosophy and 
mathematics, generally speaking the common tenets are: 1. The rational structure of the universe, 2. 
Realism, 3. Speculative Reason, 4. The concept of Relation, 5. The creativity of Mind and cosmos. 
For a detailed analysis of some oh these resemblances (and differences), see especially Reese (1952), 
Stearns (1952), Kultgen (1960), Lowe (1964), Platt (1968), Nubiola (2008), Rodriguez (2011), Brad-
ley (2012), Brioschi (2015), Henning (2015). [See also Nubiola’s paper in this same issue. Note of 
the editors].
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ics that is committed only to the physical account of the universe, but even this 
interpretation would be inconsistent with Peirce’s philosophy. In fact, according 
to Peirce, cosmology “deeply concerns both physicist and psychist” (Peirce, 1898, 
RLT 267). This assertion, which at first glance seems contradictory and confus-
ing, reflects neither inconsistency, nor hesitancy in Peirce’s thought. Rather, it 
discloses his profound conception of cosmology and his non-reductive under-
standing of the physical universe. To understand this, it is necessary to consider 
that Peirce’s cosmology is grounded upon two assumptions: one methodological, 
and the other theoretical. From a methodological perspective, to reach a success-
ful formulation of the very general laws of the universe, his cosmological thought 
primarily needs to provide a general explanation of them, and of the general fact 
of law. But what does it mean to provide an explanation of law? According to 
Peirce: “Law […] requires to be explained, and like everything which is to be 
explained must be explained by something else” (Peirce, CP 6.613). Therefore 
cosmology, in order to explain law in general, brings to light the relation of law 
with something that comes before it, by means of which only we can give reason 
to law. But the priority of this ‘something else’ that explains law, is not to be 
conceived in a chronological sense. It stands instead for a logical pre-eminence. 
It is this logical pre-eminence that is assumed as a method for every kind of ex-
planation, and metaphysical inquiry. Peirce goes so far as to say that “evolution is 
the postulate of logic, itself; for what is an explanation but the adoption of a sim-
pler supposition to account for a complex state of things” (Peirce, 1883-1884,W 
4.547). As a consequence, to build a cosmology means to find and explain the 
general laws of nature by referring them to preexistent elements that are simpler 
and more general than law. In other words, cosmology, or physical metaphysics, 
does not consist in mere observation, consideration and organization of physical 
laws: all that would not be enough to account for law themselves. This is the 
reason why, for instance, at the basis of Peirce’s cosmological thought we find as 
central the triad ‘Mind, Matter and Evolution’ (Peirce, 1891, W8. 110). This tri-
ad indicates the essential factors needed to explain the formation of laws. It also 
leads us toward Peirce’s second basic assumption, the theoretical one, concerning 
the meaning of the physical universe. Indeed, actually what does he actually 
mean by physical universe? How is it characterized?
First of all, according to the author the “primordial element of the universe” is 
“the principle of growth” (Peirce, 1892, W 8.155), which represents, together with 
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the variety of the universe, with law (which on its turn requires to be explained) 
and feeling, the evidence for believing in the existence of real chance (Peirce, CP 
6.613). Accordingly, his interpretation of the universe is diametrically opposed to 
any necessitarianist or materialistic one, because the principle of growth stands 
above mechanical laws (Peirce, 1892, W 8.155; Peirce, 1890, W 8.18). Roughly 
speaking, Peirce does not understand the universe as a realm of inert matter de-
termined in mechanistic way. His conception of the physical universe is a universe 
where freedom and spontaneity find their places, and by attributing these charac-
ters to the physical universe, Peirce modifies the meaning that we usually attribute 
to it. This renewed concept of physical universe embraces also, in a sense, what we 
call ‘the psychical,’ not because the universe is understood as an undifferentiated 
matter, but because there is no more a substantial difference in the characters of 
its parts. As the author states in “Immortality in the Light of Synechism”: “all 
phenomena are of one character, though some are more mental and spontaneous, 
other more material and regular” (Peirce, 1893, EP 2.2). Accordingly, Peirce’s 
physical universe is not opposed to mind, as Descartes and the European rational-
ism assumed: the physical universe encompasses mind, feelings, etc.
As it is well known, this peculiarity of his thought is expressed by the doc-
trine of ‘objective idealism,’ which asserts: “matter is effete mind” (Peirce, 1890, 
W 8.106). In this way, we find here another hint toward cosmology, namely its 
intimate connection to metaphysics. Leaving aside a specific discussion on ob-
jective idealism, which is far beyond the aims of the present article; from this, we 
can finally understand why the interconnection between cosmology and meta-
physics is intricate, complex, and sometimes obscure. If cosmology tackles the 
metaphysical study of the physical universe, and if the physical universe is no 
longer Cartesian, then cosmology will develop into metaphysics, and the scope 
of metaphysics will tend to be the same as that of cosmology. But is this a vicious 
circle, or rather does it lead to a profounder understanding of Peirce’s thought? 
In order to give a clear answer to this question, it is necessary to briefly touch 
upon the relationship subsisting between cosmology and logic. In fact, taking it 
into account can offer us another precious hint toward a correct comprehension 
of Peirce’s cosmology. More broadly, a brief analysis upon Peirce’s concept of 
logic helps us gain further clarification in the matter of the connection between 
cosmology and pragmaticism, and understand the need for cosmology in Peirce’s 
thought.
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§4. cosmology and logIc: VIcIous or VIrtuous cIrcle? 
The relationship between cosmology and logic shows some resemblances with 
the one just examined, even though the roles and places of metaphysics and logic 
are undoubtedly different. According to Peirce “the ideas of philosophy must be 
drawn from logic, as Kant draws his categories” (Peirce, 1890, W 8.17), and the 
same can be said for cosmology. In particular, he pinpoints that “Logic teaches 
that Chance, Law, and Continuity must be the great elements of the explanation 
of the universe” (Peirce, 1890, W 8.21). All the same, Peirce reveals that logic 
needs properly a cosmology, for the good of its own validity and efficacy. He 
states: “What sort of a conception we ought to have of the universe, how to think 
of the ensemble of things, is a fundamental problem in the theory of reasoning” 
(Peirce, 1978, W 3.307). We can see here a sort of double bind, the drawing 
of a circle that, again, is not necessarily vicious but can be virtuous: cosmology 
depends on logic and logic requires cosmology. How can it be? The question 
brings to the surface a problem that becomes even more compelling if we con-
sider that Peirce comes so far as to say that “the process of nature and the process 
of thought are at one” (Peirce, 1890, W 8.17) or –better yet– that “the process 
of nature and the process of reason are one” (Peirce, CP 6.581). Again, as in the 
case of metaphysics, we find here a peculiar commixture and inter-dependence 
between logic and cosmology, insomuch as Peirce identifies the two processes (of 
nature and reason). 
Thus, even more so, after these precise and keen statements, it seems to be 
too hard to sustain that Peirce was either just partially interested in cosmology, 
or merely confused about its relationship with metaphysics and logic. I have 
undertaken the analysis of those apparently enigmatic, or contradictory, connec-
tions to underline exactly that they are so evident that probably are not simple 
mistakes or indecisions of thought; rather, they are symptoms of something else, 
something which for sure challenges our common mindset. As it can happen if 
you enter in the semi-dark room and notice something near to you, you immedi-
ately get an idea or make a guess about what the object could be. Then, the more 
you come close to the object, the more you discover additional profiles of the 
object: each of them represents a hint toward the object itself, because it can con-
firm or contradict the hypothesis you had on it. If the guess is erroneous, what 
happens is that the hints and data you are collecting seem to be contradictory 
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and paradoxical. The same can be referred to the path followed so far. We might 
say that Peirce’s consideration of cosmology, in its connection with metaphysics 
and logic, was ultimately confused, or we can see these connections as an invita-
tion to better grasp the object that faces us: Peirce’s philosophy in his complexity.
§5. the Keystone of synechIsm
How can we explain the complicated relations between metaphysics and 
cosmology, logic and cosmology? As suggested in the previous paragraph, these 
connections become clear as soon as we examine them in the light of Peirce’s 
philosophy on the whole. In particular, in the light of synechism, the charac-
teristic and original dimension that his thought introduces into the history of 
philosophy. But what is synechism? As Peirce explains referring to the etymology 
of synechism: 
The word synechism is the English form of the Greek {synechismos}, from {syn-
echés}, continuous. For two centuries we have been affixing -ist and -ism to 
words, in order to note sects which exalt the importance of those elements which 
the stem-words signify (Peirce, 1893, EP 2.1). 
Better yet, as Peirce defines in Baldwin’s Dictionary of Philosophy and Psychol-
ogy, synechism is “[t]hat tendency of philosophical thought which insists upon 
the idea of continuity as of prime importance in philosophy and, in particular, 
upon the necessity of hypotheses involving true continuity” (Peirce, 1902, CP 
6.169). Accordingly, the idea of continuity is pivotal in Peirce’s philosophy, so 
that it is defined by him as “the keystone of the arch” (Peirce, 1900, CP 8.257), 
the keystone of his entire philosophy. Furthermore, we can easily understand 
what the primacy of continuity means, when we compare Peirce’s philosophy to 
other philosophical perspectives. Roughly speaking, as Peirce pointed out, if “ma-
terialism is the doctrine that the matter is everything, idealism the doctrine that 
ideas are everything, dualism the philosophy which splits everything into two,” 
then synechism is “the tendency to regard everything as continuous” (Peirce, EP 
2.1). Moreover, according to Peirce this strong philosophical hypothesis is what 
actually allows us to understand many facts and theories that otherwise would 
remain unclear. As Peirce himself states:
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I have thus developed as well as I could in a little space the synechistic philosophy 
[…]. I think that I have succeeded in making it clear that this doctrine gives room 
for explanation of many facts which without it are absolutely and hopelessly in-
explicable; and further that it carries along with it the following doctrines: 1st, a 
logical realism of the most pronounced type; 2nd, object idealism; 3rd, tychism, 
with its consequent thoroughgoing evolutionism (Peirce, 1892, W 8.154).
Referring to the passage just quoted, we can consider also the peculiar con-
nections between cosmology, metaphysics and logic, as some of those “facts 
which without synechism are absolutely and hopelessly inexplicable.” In other 
words, in the light of synechism the apparent contradictory connections between 
cosmology and metaphysics, cosmology and logic, find a clarification and finally 
an explanation, that is –to quote a previous Peirce’s assertion– “the adoption of 
a simpler supposition to account for a complex state of things” (Peirce, 1883-
1884, W 4.547). Indeed, on the one hand the commixture between cosmology 
and metaphysics becomes clear only once one takes into account objective ideal-
ism, which on its turn is comprehensible exclusively in a philosophy with a very 
strong idea of continuity. On the other hand, by taking into account synechism 
it is possible to understand why “the process of nature and the process of thought 
are at one”, or –in other words– why cosmology and logic say the same. Namely, 
only because the subjects these disciplines investigates are not opposed nor sep-
arated. The logic of reasoning and of the universe are different expressions of a 
unique logic of events. Thus, the above mentioned “circle” between metaphysics 
and logic and cosmology is not at all vicious, nor represents an inconsistency of 
Peirce’s work: both these relations, incomprehensible –for instance– in a Carte-
sian perspective are demanded by synechism. 
Furthermore, it is worthwhile to note that even though the connections be-
tween cosmology and metaphysics and logic are rooted in synechism, synechism 
is not “an ultimate and absolute metaphysical doctrine.” Rather, Peirce conceives 
it as a “regulative principle of logic” (Peirce, 1902, CP 6.172), the only one that 
does not “set up a barrier across the road of science” (Peirce, 1902, CP 6.171). 
A clear and brief example of what means that synechism is a principle of logic, 
one that does not block the road of inquiry (Peirce, c. 1897, CP 1.170) and is 
required by the continuous progress of science, is the following one. Peirce states:
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So the synechist will not believe that some things are conscious and some un-
conscious, unless by consciousness be meant a certain grade of feeling. He will 
rather ask what are the circumstances which raise this grade; nor will he consider 
that a chemical formula for protoplasm would be a sufficient answer. In short, 
synechism amounts to the principle that inexplicabilities are not to be considered 
as possible explanations; that whatever is supposed to be ultimate is supposed to 
be inexplicable; that continuity is the absence of ultimate parts in that which is 
divisible; and that the form under which alone anything can be understood is 
the form of generality, which is the same thing as continuity. (Peirce, CP 6.173)
And the same can be said for cosmology: on the one hand Peirce’s cosmology 
is needed by his pragmatic and synechistic conception of metaphysics and logic. 
On the other hand, as it is for synechism, the type of cosmology that Peirce aims 
to build does not represent an absolute metaphysical doctrine. Accordingly, the 
description that Peirce does of his synechistic view is helpful also to understand 
what we should seek as his proper cosmology: a theory confirmed and required 
by the discoveries of sciences, not an ultimate metaphysical standpoint. This 
then represents another hint toward Peirce’s cosmological thought: his cosmol-
ogy is not at all limited to an hypothetical reconstruction or narration of the 
origin of the universe. It stands for the metaphysical description of the universe 
structure, laws and parts required by his logic of discovery. 
Thus, so far we have analyzed Peirce’s definition of cosmology and to what 
extent Peirce’s metaphysics, as well as logic, needs it. From this perspective, we 
can finally analyzing Peirce’s mature thought in order to seek other traces of his 
interest in cosmology and, more specifically, his conception and description of 
cosmology beyond the formulation of his cosmogony.
§6. Beyond cosmogony: PeIrce’s categorIes and hIs late cosmology
As it is stated in the first part of the article, for the sake of clarity we need 
to distinguish cosmology from cosmogony. Also, it was indicated that Peirce’s 
cosmological thought is limited to the period between 1883-1898, that is to the 
period devoted to building a cosmogony. Accordingly, it is now relevant first to 
report the main features of Peirce’s cosmogony, and second to investigate Peirce’s 
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thought after 1898, seeking some evidence for his cosmology or some traces of 
its new formulation.
In order to give a synthetic overview of his cosmogony, I will especially re-
fer to his writings and manuscripts between the 1880s and the 1890s. On the 
whole, Peirce maintains that “philosophy requires a thorough-going evolution-
ism or none” (Peirce, 1891, CP 6.14), so the development of the universe is an 
evolutionary one,9 and follows an hyperbolic trajectory. Peirce explains: 
The evolution of the world is hyperbolic, that is, proceeds from one state of things 
in the infinite past, to a different state of things in the infinite future. The state 
of things in the infinite past is chaos, tohu bohu, the nothing-ness of which con-
sists in the total absence of regularity. The state of things in the infinite future 
is death, the nothingness of which consists in the complete triumph of law and 
absence of all spontaneity. Between these, we have on our side a state of things 
in which there is some absolute spontaneity counter to all law, and some degree 
of conformity to law, which is constantly on the increase owing to the growth of 
habit (Peirce, 1871, CP 8.37).
In particular, if we focus on Peirce’s view of the cosmogony, the first moment 
of the universe is “the germinal nothing, in which the whole universe is involved 
or foreshadowed. As such, it is absolutely undefined and unlimited possibility- 
boundless possibility. There is no compulsion and no law. It is “boundless free-
dom” (Peirce, CP 6.217). From this zero point of the universe, according to 
Peirce, there proceeds a state of definite qualities. As Peirce describes in “The 
Logic of Continuity”, “the very first and most fundamental element that we have 
to assume is Freedom, or Chance, or Spontaneity, by virtue of which the gen-
eral vague nothing-in-particular-ness that preceded the chaos took a thousand 
definite qualities” (Peirce, 1898, RLT 260)10. From another perspective, this first 
9 It is worthwhile to note that laws within the universe are also subject to evolution. Indeed, 
Peirce’s cosmogony aims especially at their explanation. On this point, among others, see Turley 
(1977: 64-66).
10 With regard to this primordial stage of the universe, it is useful to consider Peirce’s clarification 
in “Man’s Glassy Essence”: “I long ago showed that real existence, or thing-ness, consists in regular-
ities. So, that primeval chaos in which there was no regularity was mere nothing, from a physical 
aspect. Yet it was not a blank zero; for there was an intensity of consciousness there in comparison with 
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phase corresponds to what Peirce calls the First Category, the category of Free-
dom and Spontaneity. From nothing-ness to a world of pure qualities; from “the 
womb of indeterminacy” (Peirce, 1887-1888, EP 1.278) to a state of determined 
potentiality:11 this is the first phase of the universe, and chance is the only agent 
here at work12.
“The second element we have to assume –Peirce continues– is that there could 
be accidental reactions between those qualities. But these reactions we must think 
of as events. Not that Time was. But still, they had all the here-and-nowness of 
events” (Peirce, 1898, RLT 260). Even in this case, the description recalls the char-
acteristics of Secondness, and so we can understand the second phase, the second 
“flash” of the universe (Peirce, 1888, EP 1.278), as the appearance of Secondness. 
After this “existing universe with all its arbitrary Secondness” (Peirce, 1898, 
RLT 258) comes to the fore, Thirdness begins to appear. Peirce states: “then 
there would have come other successions ever more and more closely connected, 
the habits and the tendency to take them ever strengthening themselves, until 
the events would have been brought together into something like a continuous 
flow” (Peirce, 1887-1888, EP 1.278). Another way to describe the appearance of 
Thirdness is the following one. In Peirce’s own words:
Pairs of states will also begin to take habits, and thus each state having different 
habits with reference to the different other states, will give rise to bundles of hab-
its, which will be substances. Some of these states will chance to take habits of 
persistency, and will get to be less and less liable to disappear; while those that fail 
to take such habits will fall out of existence. […] In fact, habits, from the mode of 
their formation necessarily consist in the permanence of some relation, and there-
fore on this theory, each law of nature would consist in some permanence, such as 
the permanence of mass, momentum, and energy (Peirce, 1887-1888, EP 1.279).
From this, we can see how Peirce tries to explain the origin of the universe 
according to his triad of categories, in a perspective that we might define a “tri-
which all that we ever feel is but as the struggling of a molecule or two to throw off a little of the force 
of law to an endless and innumerable diversity of chance utterly unlimited” (Peirce, 1892, EP 1.348). 
11 Peirce defines it also as “Platonic world” (Peirce, 1898, RLT 260).
12 Cfr. Peirce, 1898, RLT 261: “Thus, when I speak of chance, I only employ a mathematical term 
to express with accuracy the characteristic of freedom or spontaneity.”
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chotomic cosmo-genesis.” Peirce’s cosmology develops indeed on the basis of his 
three categories, each representing a stage of the development of the universe: 
from the zero point of nothingness appears Firstness, then Secondness, and fi-
nally Thirdness. “Chance is First, Law is Second, the tendency to take habits is 
Third. Mind is First, Matter is Second, Evolution is Third” (Peirce, 1891, W 
8.110). In the last part of “The Architecture of Theories”, Peirce offers a brief 
description of these three phases:
It would suppose that in the beginning, –infinitely remote–, there was a chaos 
of unpersonalised feeling, which being without connection or regularity would 
properly be without existence. This feeling, sporting here and there in pure 
arbitrariness, would have started the germ of a generalising tendency. Its oth-
er sportings would be evanescent, but this would have a growing virtue. Thus, 
the tendency to habit would be started; and from this with the other principles 
of evolution all the regularities of the universe would be evolved (Peirce, 1887-
1888, EP 1.297).
Now that I have introduced the main characteristics of Peirce’s cosmogony, we 
can easily identify a difficulty, already intrinsic to this cosmogonical perspective. 
Generally speaking, cosmogony investigates the origin of the universe. In this 
case, we face a genetic description of the origin of the universe: Peirce describes 
a sequence of flashes, moments or stages, that he defines as the beginning of the 
universe. However, this interpretation of Peirce’s cosmology has a great deficien-
cy. We tend to consider the phases mentioned as chronologically ordered, while 
in fact they are not. Indeed, according to Peirce, even time takes its origin from 
these moments. If so, how can we conceive of this “vague and figurative” (Peirce, 
1887-1888, EP 1.279) theory of the origin of the universe? How can we under-
stand it while avoiding regarding it as a genetic process? A first answer comes 
from the eight lecture of the Cambridge Conferences (1898), where Peirce adopts 
the notorious example of a blackboard, which offers a diagrammatic support to 
his view of cosmology and helps understand the relation among categories not 
from a chronological perspective, but from a logical one13. 
13 Indeed Peirce states that the clean blackboard is “a sort of Diagram of the original vague potenti-
ality, or at any rate of some early stage of its determination” (Peirce, 1898, RLT 261). The blackboard 
is “nothing-ness,” a continuum of qualities, but only insofar as is purely undetermined, purely general, 
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Nonetheless, and although his purpose remains to conceive categories as logi-
cal moments, insofar as Peirce is committed to building a cosmogony (i.e., until 
the end of 1890s), he adopts categories at times as progressive phases of the 
development of the universe, and at other times as different but correlated struc-
tures of the universe. For instance, in the before mentioned “The Architecture of 
Theories”, he still associates each category with a specific era of the universe. The 
first category concerns the origin of the world; the second category concerns the 
end of things; the third category concerns the process mediating the origin and 
the end of the universe (Peirce, 1891, EP 1.296). And this cosmo-genetical view 
of the universe exactly corresponds to Peirce’s view of cosmology before 1900: 
that is, to an interpretation of cosmology in terms of cosmogony. 
Then, from 1900 onwards, Peirce began to dismiss his evolutionary cosmog-
ony, and did not return to it. At the same time, he did not abandon his idea of 
cosmology, which remains, as indicated in paragraph 1, at the very heart of his 
pragmaticism. As the Harvard Lectures on phenomenology testified to (1903), 
Peirce appeals to categories, defining them “important metaphysico-cosmical 
elements” (Peirce, 1903, EP 2.164), and stresses once more the peculiar coin-
cidence between metaphysics and cosmology, as well as the multifaceted nature 
of his categories. Furthermore, in a way very close to the description of “The 
Architecture of Theories,” in 1908 Peirce still continues to construe categories 
the pure realm of potentiality. Nothing exists in it, but everything is, potentially. Firstness is the white-
ness of the chalk-mark, or better yet whiteness per se. It is “a springing up of something new,” and it 
is “essentially indifferent as to continuity.” Indeed, it “lends itself readily to generalization but is not 
in itself general” (Peirce, 1898, RLT 262). Secondness is the “boundary between the black and white,” 
an irreducible duality. For its essence, “the limit between the whiteness and blackness is essentially 
discontinuous, or antigeneral. It is insistently this here” (Peirce, 1898, RLT 262). The universe seems 
therefore to pass from a state of vague potentiality to that of definiteness, but the process is not yet 
complete. Peirce states that “we see the original generality like the ovum of the universe segmented by 
this mark. […] No further progress beyond this can be made, until a mark will stay for a little while; 
that is, until some beginning of a habit has been established by virtue of which the accident acquires 
some incipient staying quality, some tendency toward consistency” (Peirce, 1898, RLT 262). A habit 
that begins to be established corresponds to a mark that starts to stay. In this way, a tendency to 
generalization develops, and we can refer to this as Thirdness. “This habit is a generalizing tendency, 
and as such a generalization, and as such a general, and as such a continuum or continuity” (Peirce, 
1898, RLT 262). Thirdness is not the original continuity, though it must have its origin in it, because 
continuity is always “inherent in potentiality” (Peirce, 1898, RLT 262).
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as modes of being (Peirce, 1908, CP 6.342-343). According to the analysis of 
these late writings, the universe consists of a) Firstness, conceived of as mere po-
tentiality, feelings or “atmospheric possibilities;” b) Secondness as actuality and 
existence, c) Thirdness as reason and rational connected-ness. Thus, again Peirce 
sustains them as the constitutive elements of the universe, and so we can inter-
pret these metaphysico-cosmical categories as components of Peirce’s cosmology. 
In this way, following the hints collected in the present paper, we can reason-
ably conclude that Peirce’s cosmological thought was never dismissed by him, 
even after the so-called “cosmological period.” Moreover, the tripartition of the 
universe, and therefore the irreducibility of categories, is so emphasized by Peirce 
that he goes so far as to say, in “A Neglected Argument for the Reality of God,” 
that the universe is not one, but rather that there are three universes of expe-
rience, corresponding to the three categories, described in the same way as in 
the previous citations. The character of each universe of experience is absolutely 
unique when compared with the others; however, they are not isolated universes. 
They are connected. The Third Universe (of Thirdness) consists indeed in “the 
active power to establish connections between different objects, especially be-
tween objects in different Universes” (Peirce, 1908, EP 2.435). By virtue of these 
connections, it becomes clear that Peirce’s cosmology still endorses continuity, 
as well as the irreducible categories. However, the latter are no longer described 
as different, chronological moments in the genesis of the universe, but as the 
perpetual, constituent, factors of it. At all times they are present in the universe, 
different from each other in mode and function, and encompassing all the di-
mensions of the universe. This hypothesis echoes Peirce’s “guess at the secret of 
the sphinx” as he says that “three elements are active in the world, first, chance; 
second, law; and third, habit-taking” (Peirce, 1887-1888, EP 1.277). On the 
whole, if we have understood the categories well, we can conclude that Peirce’s 
cosmology envisions a dynamical world, where both potentiality and actuality 
find their places, as well as regularity and reason, the latter being presented by 
Peirce as the “power to establish connections.” Reason represents the medium 
between potentiality and actuality, pure qualities and mere facts, feelings and 
brute reactions.
To conclude, by collecting all the hints, the overall picture of Peirce’s cosmol-
ogy is now clearer. Peirce’s definition of cosmology, and the place it occupies in 
his classifications of the sciences, helps us clarify what the meaning of cosmology 
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is according to Peirce. In particular, the difference between cosmology and cos-
mogony broaden our common understanding of Peirce’s cosmological thought. 
After this clarification, the analysis of the connections between cosmology and 
metaphysics and logic, makes emerge the methodological relevance cosmology 
has in Peirce’ thought. Furthermore, the examination of synechism reveals even 
more Peirce’s need for cosmology, and at the same time emphasizes the originali-
ty of Peirce’s conception of it. Finally, such a considerable importance pushes the 
present investigation toward Peirce’s mature thought, with some relevant results. 
Indeed, in the late writings the subject of cosmology is still present, no more in 
the shape of cosmogony, but renewed in the light of his categories and a logical 
understanding of it. 
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